



Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center

Monthly IED Activity Report



DOI: 30 September 2018

About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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Northeast Asia


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

Executive Summary: In September, there were 72 IED events within the Indo-Pacific region, consisting of 27 detonation events, 20 found/cleared events, one hoax event, and 24 cache events. Compared to August, there was a 23% decrease in IED events and a 38% decrease in IED-related casualties. September events included a total of 196 devices, compared to 397 in August. There were no IED events in Northeast Asia this month.

There were 72 IED events in the Indo-Pacific region in September 2018




Icons depict events for September 2018; heat map depicts event density from September 2017 - September 2018


September IED events



September IED events by Country




September IED Casualties



This document is limited to those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.

September Asia-Pacific IED Events by Region



Executive Summary (Continued)

SOUTH ASIA

IED activity decreased from 73 events in August to 44 in September. IED-related casualties also decreased, from 37 casualties in August to 28 in September. In Bangladesh, there were 11 IED events (compared to five in August) and no IED-related casualties (**see pg. 10**). In India, there were 31 IED events (compared to 44 in August) and 28 IED-related casualties (compared to 37 in August) (**see pg. 11**). In Nepal, there were two IED events (compared to 24 in August) and no IED-related casualties (**see pg. 12**).




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	27	47	1	96	171
	Year	747	366	31	1772	2916
Event Count	Month	18	11	1	14	44
	Year	435	231	21	240	927

SOUTHEAST ASIA

IED activity increased from 18 events in August to 28 events in September. Despite this increase, IED-related casualties decreased from 51 casualties in August to 27 in September (all of which stemmed from IED events in the Philippines). In the Philippines, there were 21 IED events (compared to 17 in August) (**see pg. 14**). In Thailand, there were four IED events (compared to one in August) (**see pg. 15**). Burma experienced IED activity for the first time since April 2018 (**see pg. 16**).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	8	10	0	7	25
	Year	264	538	15	659	1476
Event Count	Month	9	9	0	10	28
	Year	170	78	9	136	393

PACOM IED Events - Past 12 Months




		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	35	57	1	103	196
	Year	948	902	45	2403	4298
Event Count	Month	27	20	1	24	72
	Year	608	309	30	377	1324


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type



Group Affiliation



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Incident Highlight: BIFF Bombs Target Civilians

On 2 SEP, an IED detonated inside an internet café in Isulan, Philippines killing two and injuring 13. This was the second IED event to target the Sultan Kudarat province during their annual Hamungaya Festival. The first event occurred on 28 AUG at a night market that is located approximately 500 meters away from the café. This event resulted in the death of three and injured 37. The ISIS-inspired faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) under Commander Bongos claimed the first incident, while the ISIS-inspired faction of BIFF, led by Abu Turaife, claimed the second event.

Ten minutes prior to the detonation on 2 SEP, a male teenager arrived at the café carrying a white paper bag with a red stripe and sat down at an Internet cubicle. The store's security cameras captured a clear image of the suspect's face as he proceeded to leave the café without the paper bag. A subsequent explosion tore through the Internet café, causing severe damage to the external façade and completely degrading all computers and internal structures. Authorities have yet to release any specific details on the device. Although unconfirmed, one possible motive for the attacks is retaliation against the military following recent clashes.



Aftermath of 2 SEP IED attack on an Internet cafe

On 3 SEP, authorities initiated several responses in an effort to restore stability in the town and to enhance the safety of its citizens. Local police digitally enhanced and distributed the suspect's image, and the Governor posted a 1 million-peso (approximately USD 18,000) reward for any information on the 28 AUG or 2 SEP IED detonations. In an attempt to protect youth, officials also suspended all classes for elementary through college level institutions. The Regional Police Commander announced that both the Chief of Police and the Provincial Police Director were relieved of their duties for failing to prevent the attacks. The 2 SEP attack impelled high-ranking officials to implement a lockdown with increased checkpoints, patrols, and security to search for the primary suspect. Moreover, the Philippine National Police filed double murder and multiple frustrated murder charges against 13 named BIFF suspects on 18 SEP, including Abu Turaife.

These events were significant as they provide a clear indication to local authorities that the security threat in Mindanao remains high. These attacks also call into question the effectiveness of the security measures implemented due to the Marawi Siege, such as the imposition of martial law, and if these actions have resulted in a reduction of terrorist capability or activity. Likewise, it is concerning that ISIS-inspired BIFF factions claimed responsibility for both attacks, which indicates the possibility of the resurgence of these organizations. Despite these concerns, authorities' immediate implementation of counter measures indicates a serious, coordinated, and clear response to these terrorist attacks.

Sources: Inquirer (9/2/18) Newsline (9/3/18) NDBC (9/3/18) Inquirer (9/4/18) Asia Times (9/4/18) Manilla Bulletin (9/19/18)

Special Assessment: Indo-Pacific Threat Network Financing

In the Indo-Pacific region, religious extremists, separatists, terrorists, insurgents, and criminal organizations fund their operations in a variety of ways, ranging from self-funding to money provided by state and non-state donors. The diversity of funding streams is critical for these violent extremist organizations (VEO), as these groups have monetary requirements for personnel salaries, for training and sustainment resources, and, perhaps most importantly, to acquire the implements necessary for the imposition of violence (guns, explosives, ammunition, etc.). Threat networks employ multiple financing styles to include funding obtained from illegal activities (e.g. kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking, smuggling, “revolutionary taxes,” theft, etc.); legal activities (legitimate businesses); and donations and remittances received from sympathetic donors.

Extremist organizations require money to purchase weapons, explosives, food, medical supplies, ammunition, vehicles, and for transportation expenses. Operational costs are perhaps the most important, as they contribute to the primary function of a VEO: the imposition of violence to achieve a desired end state. However, there are also the “overhead” expenses of supporting the group’s daily operations, which include the costs associated with housing, members’ salaries, and recruitment. Other expenses include the “insurance” payments for the widows and orphans of members killed in combat, communications and information technology, media and propaganda services, and fees or bribes associated to smuggling operations. Large VEOs, particularly those that operate globally, likely calculate their operational budgets in the millions of dollars annually. The means used to obtain funding by VEOs are extensive and varied, primarily due to the efforts by government agencies to curb or eliminate VEO funding streams. This paper will analyze several of the funding methodologies employed by VEOs in the Indo-Pacific and highlight specific vignettes associated to each threat finance approach.

Donations and Remittances

External threat financing for Indo-Pacific VEOs derives predominantly from sympathetic foreign donors or via remittance payments submitted by unwitting patrons. The value of remittances in developing countries often rival the financial inflows originating from foreign direct investment. Such a significant scale of monetary influx is concerning, as some of the remittance payments inevitably flow to terrorist and other extremist groups. In the Philippines, personal remittances account for almost 10% of the state’s gross national income and economic observers note that organizations such as the Maute Group and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) intercept and exploit this funding stream for their malicious purposes. The typically low-value, individual money transfers and the large volume of total transactions create problems for detection and tracing, as there are no simple methods to parse out illicit funding activities from the region’s high-volume of legitimate money flows. Non-Profit Organizations are also leveraged for money transfers, with both witting and unwitting donations to VEOs occurring. Lax or inadequate border security, porous border areas (including maritime borders), and cash-only local economies amplify the challenges for authorities to detect and interdict VEO financing operations.



Marawi, Philippines—Money valued at USD 2.8 million seized from a Maute Group house in June 2017

Informal Economies

Informal economies (i.e. those economic actions not regulated or protected by a state) and black-market activities, which are prevalent throughout the Indo-Pacific, add to the complexity of detecting, tracing, and stopping illicit money flows. Informal cash economies operate in many regional countries and are often more accessible and reliable, which implies a large volume of small-scale untraceable money transfers. In some sectors, the inability of people to access legitimate banking systems or secure loans encourages the continuance of informal economic practices. Terrorist financing flows can be “hidden in plain sight,” as VEOs leverage the multitude of money transfer and informal economy options to move, make, and store money. A recent addition to a VEO’s means to acquire and transfer funding are stored value charge cards. These cards are loaded with currency, transferred, stored, or hidden, and used later to fund VEO activities. Because of the legitimate uses of these cards, it is also difficult to parse out illicit uses or to discourage their use.

Self-Funding

AUSTRAC’s 2016 Regional Risk Assessment notes that Indo-Pacific based VEOs use self-funding as a common

Special Assessment: Indo-Pacific Threat Network Financing

approach to fund their operations. Self-funding includes a wide variety of criminal activity, to include robbery, extortion, money laundering, kidnapping-for-ransom, smuggling, counterfeiting, operating profitable drug operations, and, to some measure, legitimate business operations. Moreover, populations residing in under-governed areas, such as the southern Philippines, are often victims of local VEO “shakedowns,” which include actions such as illegal taxation, forced protection services, and petty theft. The acquisition of money from a population, though possibly lucrative, is not an effective long-term means for VEO financing, as these actions foment distrust and animosity directed at the group from the local populace. Nonetheless, because of intimidation and consistent threats of violence, these practices become normalized and tacitly accepted by the population. For example, in the southern Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group relies upon exploitation of the locals as a primary means for obtaining cash. A prime example of self-funding occurred during the 2017 Siege of Marawi, when ISIS-Philippines (ISIS-PHL) attempted to “own” a whole metropolitan area, including its citizens, businesses, and banking system. The Armed Forces of the Philippines eventually defeated ISIS-PHL, but after a very expensive and time-consuming operation that allowed the group to raid and abscond with an unknown amount of money.

Kidnapping for Ransom

Kidnapping for ransom (KFR) has been quite lucrative for some regional VEOs, most notably in the Philippines (specifically, in the southern region of Mindanao and in maritime areas), where the ASG, the BIFF, and the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA) are the recognized perpetrators that conduct this activity. The ASG is a prime example of an organization that relies significantly on KFR for income. Estimates place the revenue earned by ASG from KFR operations in the millions since 2000. However, due to involvement in the 2017 Siege of Marawi and pressure placed on the organization by Philippine security forces, the rate of ASG KFR activities has declined significantly. Nonetheless, it is likely that the group will seek to overcome recent financial losses via further future KFR operations.



ASG ransom video; ASG captured three foreigners and one Filipina in 2015. Ultimately, Canadians John Ridsdel and Robert Hall were executed in mid-2016.

Smuggling

It is a common practice for VEOs to exploit the porous and unsecured borders existing throughout the Indo-Pacific region to move personnel, weapons, explosives, and courier money. Estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime place the financial costs of smuggling in Southeast Asia of up to USD 100 billion annually. One lucrative item smuggled easily and for great profit, are illegal cigarettes, which terrorists use to finance their activities. A 2012 study by the tobacco industry found that an estimated 66 billion illegal cigarettes were smuggled and sold in Southeast Asia, and Interpol suspects that a portion of the profits likely directly or indirectly funds VEOs in the region. Other items smuggled that VEOs acquire profits from include fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN), drugs, wildlife, and people.

Conclusion

In the Indo-Pacific region, VEOs use multiple financing methodologies to amass the funds necessary to support a group’s operations. Generally, many of these organizations rely heavily upon criminal activity (e.g. KFR, smuggling, theft) and local donations to sustain their activities, while receiving support externally via remittance payments and possibly state-based donorship. It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, it is important to note that once a group generates funds, they distribute capital locally and sometimes internationally via multiple methods (e.g. cash transfers, front companies, charities). Addressing the problem of VEO threat financing is problematic, particularly due to the difficulties of definitively identifying nefarious funding streams. Nonetheless, countering threat financing is an integral component of states’ counterterrorism strategies.

Sources: AUSTRAC Stored Value Cards (2017) AUSTRAC Regional Risk Assessment (2016) The Straits Times (01/09/17) ABS CBN News (01/23/18) RAND Testimony (09/28/18) Asia-Pacific Group Typologies Report (07/18) World Bank Press Release (04/23/18) Control Risks (03/22/18) Testimony to U.S. House of Representatives (03/20/18) UNODC (09/27/17) Forbes (2018) South China Morning Post (11/08/17) NYA24 (04/18) Asia Sentinel (05/03/17) NBC News (11/18/15) US Treasury Press Release (07/31/18) PHIL Star (06/06/17) UNODC (2016) Reuters (10/29/15)

Person of Interest / VEO of Interest

POI: Nasori Saeseng		
ALIAS: Awae Khaelae; Nasori Waeseng; Nasoree Saesaeng; Poh Wae; Haji Wae; Awae Kaelae; Sori; Wae Ka Raeh AFFILIATION: MARA Patani Group, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP) AREA OF OPERATIONS: Pattani, Thailand, northern Malaysia		
<p>Nasori Saeseng is a founding member and current deputy leader of the GMIP, or the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement. He is a dual citizen of Thailand and Malaysia, but was born in Bacho, Narathiwat, Thailand. Saeseng gained combat experience abroad and is reportedly in command of the armed wing of GMIP.</p> <p>Saeseng co-founded the GMIP in southern Thailand in 1995 and has since developed and maintained deep connections with other Southeast Asia violent extremist groups. He trained in Libya and fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. During his tenure in Afghanistan, he trained with Nik Adli, the former leader of the Kum-pulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), which was a key supporter of Islamic extremist ideologies and who sponsored the formation of a Southeast Asian Islamic State in the 1990s. Between 2001 and 2004, government officials issued multiple arrest warrants for Saesaeng along with a reward of USD 92,965 for his arrest. The warrants included various criminal charges such as extortion, robbery, attempted murder, and illegal weapon possession.</p> <p>Saeseng remained at large until August 2018, when he entered the Bring People Home Project. His motivation for surrender has yet to be determined. The Thai government initiated the project in 2013, which allows former militants to live in their home villages while attending activities such as “attitude adjustment” indoctrination sessions and vocational training aimed at helping them get jobs and to reintegrate back into civilian life. Participants in the project are required to cooperate with authorities, but likewise run the risk of reprisal from active militants if they share too much information about their former groups. Despite Saeseng’s voluntary surrender, the effectiveness of the Bring People Home Project and overall reconciliation efforts on the southern Thailand insurgency remain questionable. However, the submission of a well-known and recognized militant, such as Saeseng, to rehabilitation programs could indicate a decline in the morale of insurgent organizations.</p>		
<p>Sources: BenarNews (9/2/18) Isranews (12/26/18) Xinhuanet (8/14/18) <i>Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement</i>, By Tore Bjorgo & John G. Horgan (10/28/08) <i>Terrorist Inc.: A Multinational Corporation</i> By Kent Hammond (7/7/11) <i>Historical Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalism</i> By Mathieu Guidère (9/20/17) TRAC (10/1/18) Farang (Issue 6/2012) IDA (9/2005) NDIC (3/2007) <i>The Terrorist Threat from Thailand, Jihad or Quest for Justice</i> (2013)</p>		
VEO: Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)		
LEADER: Yung Aung AREA OF OPERATIONS: Northeast India, Western Burma AFFILIATIONS: NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)		
<p>The NSCN-K is an ethno-separatist militant group that primarily operates along the border of India and Burma, in an area known as Nagaland. The Naga, a Christian ethnic minority group, first sought independence from India under the British in 1918. The group was originally part of the NSCN (founded in 1980); however, division amongst Nagaland’s different ethnic groups (Nagas, Konyaks, and Tangkhuls) resulted in NSCN-K breaking away in April 1988. NSCN-K is committed to establishing a Naga-controlled independent state and its headquarters and training camps are located in the region of Sagaing, Burma. The organization has an estimated 2,000 members and engages in criminal and militant activity. NSCN-K targets security forces with IEDs and small arms, and commonly engages in extortion and kidnapping.</p> <p>Khango Konyak and SS Khaplang founded NSCN-K, and Konyak led the organization after Khaplang’s death for 14 months. In August 2018, senior leaders of NSCN-K voted “no confidence” in Konyak and removed him as chairman. Konyak’s critics blamed him for failing to organize the group in the wake of Khaplang’s death, for failing to forward the goals of the NSCN-K, and for the loss of an NSCN-K outpost near Sagaing, Burma to the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw). Konyak’s departure initiated a split in the Burmese and Indian factions: the Indian faction led by Konyak and the Burmese faction led by Yung Aung, a Burmese Naga and nephew of SS Khaplang. Aung, a graduate of Imphal University who possesses an expertise in explosives procurement, reportedly received training abroad in the 1990s. After the split, Konyak and the Indian faction fled to India and signaled in September 2018 that they might initiate peace talks with the Indian government. The Burmese faction quickly condemned the move and recommitted to fighting for Naga independence.</p> <p>It is unknown what will result from the NSCN-K split; however, political events on the Indian side of border, such as re-districting and peace deals with certain armed ethnic groups (at the exclusion of others), may encourage an escalation of violence. On the Burma side of the border, the Tatmadaw have increased their actions against NSCN-K after the recent collapse of a 2012 ceasefire agreement. The NSCN-K under Aung will now have to decide if it will fulfill the demands of the Burmese government and if it will sign the National Ceasefire Agreement. It is doubtful that Aung will be willing to meet the requirements to lay down arms and abandon Naga independence.</p>		
<p>Sources: SATP (NSCN-IM) SATP (NSCN-K) Kangla Online (4/24/15) Times of India (4/29/15) Indian Express (6/11/15) NDTV (12/25/15) Indian Express (5/19/18) TOI (8/17/18) The Week (8/18/18) Irrawaddy (8/20/18) TOI (9/29/18)</p>		

South Asia: September Significant Activity

Regional Cooperation

On 17 SEP, five South Asian countries agreed to form a network in the Hindu Kush Himalaya region to improve mountain economies and to address climate change concerns. Officials from Nepal, Bhutan, India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan agreed on a set of principles to protect snow cover and glaciers, as the water from these glaciers serves approximately 1.3 billion people in Central, South, and Southeast Asia. Additionally, it is an extremely valuable agricultural resource and the source of hydro-energy production. **Daily Star (9/19/18)**

Bangladesh

Over 20 days in August and September, Bangladeshi authorities arrested more than 100,000 individuals accused as suspects in approximately 1200 court cases throughout the country. Many of those arrested are members of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and BNP leaders are claiming the government is targeting their activists and leaders in an attempt to destabilize the party ahead of the upcoming national elections. Election violence, including fire bombings and IED activity, commonly occurs in Bangladesh, and the Awami League-led government insists the arrests are a preventative measure. Government officials and police responded to BNP condemnation, stating the arrests have nothing to do with politics, and the detainees were previously accused in cases or had arrest warrants filed against them. Authorities also warned against the possibility of false information spreading via social media ahead of the national polls. **Daily Star (9/10/18)**

India

On 10 SEP, media reported that the number of Maoist insurgents has declined by 40% over the past three years in areas where they have been most prevalent. The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), directed by General R.R. Bhatnagar, reported the states most impacted by the Maoist/Naxalite insurgency are Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and Jharkhand, with the greatest concentration of extremists in south Bastar, Chhattisgarh. CRPF opened 15 new camps in Chhattisgarh over the past year, which reportedly contributed to the successful reduction in Maoist activity. General Bhatnagar stated that IEDs remain the greatest threat to security forces, thus the government is considering steps to reduce the easy availability of explosive materials and to ensure commercially manufactured detonators are equipped with built-in delay mechanisms, security codes, and advanced tracking technology. **The Hindu (9/10/18)**

On 24 SEP, legislators and political leaders in Chhattisgarh were propelled into a posture of great vigilance, as the state heads to the polls in the shadow of the killings of two prominent legislators in Andhra Pradesh on 23 SEP. Security forces have increased measures to protect political figures as well, particularly in Maoist dominated Bastar, the center of insurgent activity in Chhattisgarh. Police have reportedly restricted the movements of key political players and requested notification of possible security risks prior to entering the interior villages of Bastar. Meanwhile, Maoists are threatening citizens to boycott elections and to create disturbances at polling places—a common tactic designed to destabilize the democratic process in insurgent held regions. Maoists are also likely to seek national attention during this politically charged period by attempting high-profile attacks. **First Post (9/24/18)**

On 30 SEP, reporting from the remote Abujhmad region of Chhattisgarh highlighted a new tactic recently employed by police to gain the confidence of the local tribal population: mini-theater. Abujhmad is an extremely isolated area of dense forest and is home to a large concentration of Maoist insurgents. There are few TVs and no cinemas in this remote area of India and the introduction of film was very well received by the people. The variety of film locals found most interesting were films featuring animals and nature, as opposed to popular Hindi movies and shows about which the tribal population is largely unfamiliar. The objective of police was to bring people together in an effort to entertain them while also educating them on government programs that would benefit them and to dissuade this isolated population from engaging with or supporting Maoist insurgents. **Hindustan Times (9/10/18)**

On SEP 30, media reports the Indian state of Karnataka's high court is taking issue with the seeming lack of efforts by law enforcement and intelligence agencies to locate a reported 7,000 missing persons from the state since 2015. There is concern that some or many of these missing people could be the victims of international human trafficking or perhaps may have been recruited by international terrorist organizations. Of particular interest to the court is a perceived decline in the state's security environment. A specific concern is the disappearance of a significant number of men who may now be trained terrorists and the possibility they may return to Bengaluru, the state's capital city (formerly Bangalore) to destabilize one of India's primary economic hubs and cultural centers. **Indian Express (9/30/18)**

South Asia: September Significant Activity


Nepal

On 20 SEP, four gunmen on motorcycles shot and killed Maulana Khursid Ansari, the principal of Rauyan National Public School in Sunsari. The assailants then fled across the border into India, despite attempts by Nepal's Armed Police Force (APF) to stop their escape. The suspects wounded one APF officer when they opened fire on the APF blockade. Shortly after the attack, Indian Intelligence agencies released details about Ansari, stating that he was an Indian Mujahideen (IM) agent who had offered safe harbor to terrorists over the last few years. The reports allege that Ansari had attended madrassa with IM operatives and helped some of them secure Nepali identity papers and passports. Indian officials also stated that the school and the NGO Ansari operated were front businesses designed to conceal his activities. Meanwhile, Nepali officials declared Ansari a martyr and paid his family the equivalent of USD 8,615 in compensation, following protests by the local community. **Kathmandu Post (8/20/18) Kathmandu Post (9/21/18) Kathmandu Post (8/23/18) Times of India (9/23/18) Times of India (9/26/18)**

Maldives

On 23 SEP, national elections in the Maldives saw the ousting of President Abdulla Yameen from office, as opposition candidate Ibrahim Mohamed Solih received 58.3% of the vote (voter turnout was approximately 90%). Several corruption scandals and a crackdown on political opponents marred Yameen's presidency. Yameen's government also moved further from its traditional ally, India, and towards China. This controversial move saw increasing Chinese investment in the Maldives, which included several, high-profile infrastructure development projects. It is likely that under President-elect Solih, the Maldives will move closer back towards India and the Commonwealth. For instance, India's President Modi contacted Solih shortly after the election victory announcement to offer his congratulations and to invite the President-elect to India to discuss future relations. Solih's swearing in will occur on 17 NOV. **NPR (9/24/18) Maldives Independent (9/25/18) al Jazeera (9/25/18)**

Bangladesh: September IED Events



There were two IED detonation events and nine IED cache events.




On 4 SEP, local police from three towns recovered IED caches from BNP members in Meherpur, Khulna; 67 suspects detained. The combined caches contained 13 bombs, 25 crude grenades, and 65 firecrackers. **Dhaka Tribune (9/6/18)**

On 16 SEP, local police recovered an IED cache and detained five suspects following a raid on a secret meeting of suspected Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Chhatria Shibir activists in Sagorika, Chittagong. The cache contained three crude bombs and militant books. Police allege the suspects were planning to conduct subversive activities. **Daily Star (9/18/18)**

On 22 SEP, local police recovered IED caches and detained 67 suspects during several raids in Kushtia, Khulna. The combined caches contained 26 improvised bombs, five petrol bombs, 85 yaba tablets, 350g marijuana, 50g heroin, and two liters of locally made alcohol. **Dhaka Tribune (9/22/18)**


IED events remained steady in September, with all events being caches for the second month in a row. Authorities recovered the caches as a part of a larger drive to detain individuals who police claim have active warrants and/or pending court cases. While critics have protested the mass arrests, authorities insist they are necessary to prevent violence ahead of national elections (**see SA SIGACTs**). It is likely that IED activity will remain consistently low for the next month or two, but it is possible that violent activity could increase prior to and during elections. Historical evidence demonstrates a sharp increase in IED activity during elections in Bangladesh.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	6	0	0	91	97
	Year	62	14	1	263	340
Event Count	Month	2	0	0	9	11
	Year	29	7	1	51	88



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

India: September IED Events



There were 16 IED detonation events, nine IED found and cleared events, one IED hoax event, and five IED cache events.

On 4 SEP, police seized an illegal explosives cache from Dhalghar Phata, Raigad, Maharashtra after receiving a complaint. The explosives were allegedly for fishing and mining. The cache contained 965 electronic detonators and 46 gelatin sticks. **Times of India (9/4/18)**

On 6 SEP, CRPF and Jharkhand police recovered 33 IEDs near Parasanath Hills, Giridih, Jharkhand. Maoists allegedly placed the IEDs in a 2km radius near Bankharo Drainage. Police suspect that militants were going to use the explosives to target security forces. **Business Standard (9/6/18)**

On 27 SEP, CRPF and local police seized a cache of IED components and explosives from a known expert Naxalite bomb maker, identified as Baldev Soren. Police detained Soren in Giridih, Jharkhand. The cache contained three bundles of detonating cord, 55 detonators, and 175kg of explosives, along with other incriminating materials. **Business Standard (9/27/18)**


Overall IED activity for this month was sporadic throughout the country and although the majority of events were detonations, the trend of note has been the large caches of explosives found in the past few months.

Large caches like the ones on 4 SEP and 27 SEP have been observed more frequently in the past few months, and the explosives quantities have been larger than what are usually found throughout India. The number of explosives recently found resemble "commercial-use" amounts and could indicate the possibility of an increasing availability of commercial grade explosives, possibly for both IED construction and illegal mining. Given that the locations of the finds are within known insurgent areas or areas in which mining operations are prevalent, it is possible militants are smuggling the explosives for nefarious purposes.


Parasanath Hills is a Maoist stronghold, often used as a location where security forces recover caches and where militants emplace IEDs that target security forces. It is possible that militants connected the 33 IEDs cleared on 6 SEP in series, which has been seen in Jharkhand in previous years. Parasanath Hills is a strategically important position because it lies along a major road between Jharkhand and West Bengal, making it possible that militant groups that do not usually interact could trade in explosives or TTPs.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	21	43	1	5	70
	Year	507	225	7	1490	2229
Event Count	Month	16	9	1	5	31
	Year	260	111	7	174	552


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Nepal: September IED Events






There were two IED found and cleared events.

On 9 SEP, local police and Nepal Army EOD cleared three IEDs from a house in Narayansthan, Ilam, Mechi. Authorities described the IEDs as two socket bombs and one sutali bomb (firecracker). Police discovered the IEDs while conducting a patrol near the District Police Office. **Nepal Monitor (9/9/18)**

On 25 SEP, local police and Nepal Army EOD cleared an IED from the front of the District Hospital in Simkot, Humla, Karnali. Authorities described the IED as a sutali bomb. **Nepal Monitor (9/25/18)**

IED activity dropped significantly in September, down from 24 events in August. This decline in events occurred despite concerns over the celebration of Constitution Day and a transportation blockade, which impacted petrol sales. While there were some localized protests over Constitution Day (primarily in the Terai region), the holiday passed absent significant violent activity and appeared to have no impact on IED activity. Likewise, the transportation blockade, called in protest of new traffic laws, did not foment any increased activity. Other protest movements, mainly focused on demanding justice for rape victims, passed peacefully throughout the month of September as well.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	4	0	0	4
	Year	178	127	23	17	345
Event Count	Month	0	2	0	0	2
	Year	146	113	13	11	283



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Southeast Asia: September Significant Activity

Philippines

On 2 SEP, President Duterte became the first Filipino president to visit Israel since the two nations established bilateral ties in 1957. Officials held multiple discussions and signed memorandums of agreement during Duterte's three-day trip, addressing such issues as security, defense development, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. One of the most significant arrangements made during the trip was a pre-placed order of defense related items, such as missile systems, armored personnel carriers, and radars. Additionally, there were several indications that would suggest Israel is set to open a firearms production plant in the Philippines in 2019. **The Diplomat (9/18/18) Technochops (9/13/18)**

On 11 SEP, two Indonesian fishermen on a Malaysian boat (Dwijaya 1) were kidnapped at gunpoint from their trawler near the Semporna Islands in Sabah, Malaysia. According to an intelligence source, a two-man cell led by ASG militant Titing used pump boats to sneak from Siluag Island in the southern Philippines into Sabah waters by navigating through shallow shoals. The militants, armed with M16s, snatched Samsul Sagunim (40) and Usman Yunus (35) while two other crew members were able to evade capture by hiding. The two captured Indonesians are now reportedly being held in Patikul, Jolo by ASG sub-commander Indang Susukan. The 11 SEP kidnapping differs from previous TTPs used by ASG in two key ways: the type of vessel used and the number of ASG militants. Typically, two or more motorized crafts armed with five to ten militants would conduct the abductions. This event exhibited only one speedboat and two militants. This event marks the first successful abduction in Sabah waters in 21 months. **Oceanus Live (9/18/18) The Star (9/27/18)**

On 21 SEP, protesters of all ages and demographics across the country went out to their respective districts to join rallies in commemorating the 46th anniversary of Proclamation 1081, signed by Dictator Ferdinand Marcos on 21 SEP 1972, which held the entire country under martial law. Thousands of people mourned the gross atrocities and human rights abuses that took place over the nine years under Marcos' martial law. Activists commemorating the day also protested against President Duterte's implementation of martial law in Mindanao, which has been ongoing since the Marawi Siege in 2017 and was recently extended until December 2018. **Sunnenews (9/21/18)**

Burma

On 11 SEP, suspected insurgents engaged in small arms fire while security forces were raiding a residence and property in Hpakant, Kachin. The Tatmadaw returned fire, forcing four suspects to flee and eventually detained three suspects. The Tatmadaw conducted the search on suspicion that the alleged insurgents were extorting money for the Arakan Army. **Irrawaddy (8/13/18)**

On 19 SEP, near Union Highway in Shan State, two landmine explosions occurred along Namt Taung village to Pang Sai. The first device detonated around 1330 and resulted in no casualties. Another detonation occurred at 1520, killing one and wounding one. **Eleven (9/20/18)**

Thailand

On 14 AUG, GMIP deputy leader Nasori Saeseng (Awae Kaelae) surrendered at an army ranger's unit in Kapor, Pattani (**see POI**). **The ASEAN Post (9/13/18)**


On 11 SEP, in Ban Donna, Pattani, more than 10 militants hiding in vegetation alongside the road ambushed a patrol unit on three motorcycles. During the ambush, militants killed two army rangers and injured four. Four suspects confessed to the crime. **Bangkok Post (9/12/18) Thaiger (9/19/18)**

In response to the 11 SEP attack on a patrol unit, the Forward Command of the Internal Security Operations Command Region 4 identified the areas of Bang Khao and Tha Kham Cham in Non Chik District as Special Control Zones. This is the first time in a decade that government officials have declared a special control zone. As a result, residents are required to turn over any weapons, ammunition, and vehicles and are subject to inspection by military officials. **Thaiger (9/19/18)**

Malaysia

On 14 SEP, Malaysian police announced a series of arrests that occurred between 11 and 31 AUG and that foiled two major plots. Special Branch arrested a total of 10 suspected terrorists across seven states. Five of the suspects comprised the Asoib group or "Youth from the East." These individuals, aged between 39 and 53, were planning to join a terrorist group from a country in the Middle East and assist them in launching an attack on another country. The hosting terrorist organization was reportedly going to supply the Asoib group with various weapons as soon as they arrived. According to police, one Asoib member had already left for the Middle Eastern country to prepare and organize the operations for the attack. According to an anonymous news source, the unnamed Middle Eastern country is reportedly Yemen, and the targeted country was Saudi Arabia. The other five suspects belonged to a terror cell known as Ar Rayah. Among these suspects included a 50-year-old foreigner, reportedly a Thai militant, who was promoting the struggle of his organization to members on the Ar Rayah WhatsApp chat group. The cell was planning to launch attacks on entertainment outlets in Melaka using smoke bombs. They believed using such bombs would cause a panic, which in turn would lead to heavy casualties. Police seized five smoke bombs during the raid. **Channel News Asia (9/14/18)**

Philippines: September IED Events



There were seven IED detonation events, seven IED found and cleared events, and seven IED cache events.

On 3 SEP, an IED detonated at the Masbate Port in Masbate, Bicol, Masbate, damaging two boats belonging to the Philippine Army and the Philippine Coast Guard. This is the second attack on Masbate Port within 30 days, but no direct links were made between this attack and the previous one. The orange PVC pipe recovered is similar to other New People's Army (NPA) remnants from previous attacks. **Manilla Bulletin (9/3/18) Inquirer (9/3/18)**


On 8 SEP, authorities recovered an IED cache from a residence in General Paulino Santos, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, SOCCSKARGEN, Mindanao. The execution of an arrest warrant by the Philippines Intelligence Service for the kidnapping of an AFP member led police to the discovery of the cache. The cache contained one M203 rifle grenade placed inside a PVC pipe measuring three inches long and three inches wide, with three blasting caps connected to a black wire and the other two placed inside a plastic bottle. **PHILSTAR (9/9/18) NDBC (9/8/18)**

On 16 SEP, an IED detonated near a pharmacy in General Santos, South Cotabato, SOCCSKARGEN, Mindanao, resulting in eight injured. Authorities arrested the primary subject in the attack and charged him for illegal drug possession. Authorities also identified a further 16 suspects belonging to an Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP) faction, the Nilong Group. **Minda News (9/26/18) NBDC (9/21/18) PIA (9/17/18)**


IED activity in September was slightly higher than August, with the majority of events being detonations in Mindanao perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups. The consecutive attacks on civilian targets in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat (**see Incident Highlight**) likely aimed to create fear in the local populace and to reduce their confidence in security forces. To counteract these actions, security forces increased their proactive posture ahead of upcoming festivals in October. Additionally, two Mindanao towns replaced senior security officials in September, which may improve responses to potential threats in the coming months.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	7	8	0	6	21
	Year	83	472	2	220	777
Event Count	Month	7	7	0	7	21
	Year	77	46	2	97	222


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type




Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Thailand: September IED Events



There were two IED detonation events and two IED found and cleared events.


On 8 SEP, authorities recovered a 20kg gas cylinder IED after police stopped three men on two motorcycles in Sai Buri, Pattani while on patrol at a rubber plantation. Police discovered the detonating circuit under the passenger portion of one of the motorcycles. Police detained the three men. **The Nation (9/8/18)**

On 9 SEP, a suspected incendiary device detonated in front of a motorcycle repair shop in Chana, Songkhla, causing a fire and damaging the front of the building and a few motorcycles. It is unclear if the incendiary device was improvised. Roughly, 500 meters away from the motorcycle repair shop, a roadside IED also detonated, slightly damaging an armored vehicle. Authorities also recovered a 5kg IED approximately one meter under the road. Officials suspect the detonations were used to draw in first responders for targeting. **Bangkok Post (9/10/18)**


This month, IED activity in Thailand remained low for the fourth consecutive month. The 20kg gas cylinder recovered by officials in Pattani on 8 SEP was only the second event incorporating a gas cylinder as a container in 2018. In January 2017, in an effort to stop violence in Thailand's Deep South, the Fourth Army Commander, Lt. General Piyawat Nakwanich, banned the use of steel cooking-gas cylinders weighing 15kg or less. This container type was a commonly used IED TTP by southern Thai Insurgents (STI) prior to the 2017 ban. Although IED activity will likely remain low in the coming months due to the possible lack of resources and financing, the STI is likely to continue to carry out calculated and organized attacks.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	1	2	0	0	3
	Year	69	25	1	57	152
Event Count	Month	2	2	0	0	4
	Year	63	18	1	11	93


Past Year IED Event Casualty Count



Past Year IED Events by Type



Past Year Devices



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Burma: September IED Events






There were three IED cache events.

On 4 SEP, military officials along with local police discovered a cache of 164,500 commercial grade detonators in a truck at the Kyaukme tollgate, which was travelling from Lashio to Mandalay. Officials detained two suspects. The detonators were wrapped in bundles and labeled with tags written in Chinese. **Irrawaddy (9/6/18) Myanmar Times (9/7/18)**

IED activity in Burma remains low, following the overall trend since March 2018. The single event this month was the cache of detonators discovered on 4 SEP. Although these types of components are commonly used in Hpakant, Kachin State in the jade and gold mining industry, the amount of detonators recovered from the vehicle, totaling 164,500, is suspicious. A cache of this size could be either sold or potentially used for illegal mining activities in the region (**see SEA SIGACTs**). It is likely IED activity will continue to remain low in the coming months; however, there is a possibility of an uptick in violence given the on-going instability in several states, such as northern Kachin and Rakhine.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	24	31	0	55	110
Event Count	Month	0	0	0	3	3
	Year	17	11	0	8	36



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations.

Northeast Asia: September Significant Activity

China: Vehicle Attack

On 12 SEP, a man drove an SUV into a crowded public square in Hengyang City, Hunan Province in an apparent attempt to kill civilians. He then attacked people with a knife and shovel, killing 11 and injuring 44. Police detained 54 year-old Yang Zanyun, who has served prior sentences for drug trafficking, theft, arson, and assault. According to Hengyang City officials, Yang's previous incarceration motivated him to take revenge on society. In China, one of the most common reasons for IED and other violent activity in public places is to express overwhelming frustration or personal grievances.

Attacking crowds with vehicles is a relatively recent phenomenon in China, and may be a byproduct of China's crackdowns on terrorism in the past years. Violent terrorist attacks involving cars are well-known and well-documented; tech-savvy terrorists/criminals began to spread the word about the ease of using cars to attack crowds through their sophisticated network of online publications and social media profiles. Before 2006, vehicle ramming attacks were sporadic and largely focused on government, military, and police installations without much effect in terms of damage. **The Guardian (9/13/18)**

Uighur Diaspora

In October 2018, new investigative reporting on China's ethnic Uighurs revealed a tactic used by Chinese authorities to track diaspora populations, find Uighurs they did not know were abroad, and then find ways to control them. After authorities find Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR)-based family members of diaspora Uighurs, they then detain or question the families to ensure that the Uighurs living abroad will report to Chinese agents about other Uighurs in the diaspora communities; essentially, this is a tactic designed to compel diaspora Uighurs to spy on each other. In Sweden, local police arrested some Uighurs who spied on their Uighur neighbors. This Chinese tactic to track down all Uighurs is not new, but is becoming more apparent to global audiences. This is part of the expansion of the police state in Xinjiang that includes re-education centers with mass incarcerations and harsh treatment, abundant police checkpoints, extensive biometrics tracking, and other invasions of privacy and religious discrimination. All these stressors on the Uighurs are designed to control them and keep them from becoming radical extremists. However, the stressful treatment itself may actually become a rationale for radicalization. **The Diplomat (10/1/18)**

Japan

On 25 SEP, Japanese police detained a Nagoya university student for making and possessing illegal narcotics. This is the third arrest for the same suspect in the last two months (**see August 2018 Monthly**). On 7 SEP, police arrested him for making and possessing a 3D-printed firearm. Additionally, in August, police arrested him for making and possessing the explosives triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and penthrite. **Kyodo News (9/27/18)**

IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

1 SEP 2007 (BUR): Anniversary of Saffron Revolution

9 SEP 2004 (INDO): Anniversary of Australian Embassy Bombing

11 SEP-9 OCT (WW): Al-Hijrah Islamic New Year

25 SEP 2002 (IND): Akshardham Temple Attack

1 OCT 2005 (INDO): Bali attack anniversary

23 OCT 2017 (PHL): Marawi City re-taken by Armed Forces of the Philippines from ISIS-P

24 OCT 2002 (THA): Tak Bai Incident

21 NOV 2006 (NEP): Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord ending the civil war

23 NOV 2009 (PHL): Maguindanao Massacre

26 NOV 2008 (IND): Mumbai attack

IND – India
INDO – Indonesia
PHL – Philippines
THA – Thailand
BUR – Burma
NEP – Nepal
WW – Worldwide

	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
September 2018	26	27	28	29	30	31	1 BUR
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	9 INDO	10	11 WW	12 WW	13 WW	14 WW	15 WW
	16 WW	17 WW	18 WW	19 WW	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW
	23 WW	24 WW	25 IND WW	26 WW	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW
October 2018	30 WW	1 WW INDO	2 WW	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6 WW
	7 WW	8 WW	9 WW	10	11	12	13
	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	21	22	23 PHL	24 THA	25	26	27
November 2018	28	29	30	31	1	2	3
	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	18	19	20	21 NEP	22	23 PHL	24
	25	26 IND	27	28	29	30	1

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN – Ammonium Nitrate	PCB – Printed Circuit Board
ANFO – Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil	PN – Partner Nation
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	PPIED – Pressure Plate IED
CIV – Civilian	QRF – Quick Response Force
CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear	RCIED – Radio Controlled IED
COIN – Counter-insurgency	RCP – Route Clearance Patrols
CWIED – Command Wire IED	RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade
DTMF – Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency	SA – South Asia
EFP – Explosively Formed Projectile	SAF – Small Arms Fire
EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal	SEA – Southeast Asia
F/C – Found & Cleared	SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne IED
HME – Homemade Explosives	TATP – Triacetone Triperoxide
HN – Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)	TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C ₇ H ₅ N ₃ O ₆)
IDF – Indirect Fire	TTP – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
IDP – Internally Displaced Persons	UXO – Unexploded Ordnance
IED – Improvised Explosive Device	VBIED – Vehicle Borne IED
KFR – Kidnap for Ransom	VEO – Violent Extremist Organization
KIA – Killed in Action	VOIED – Victim Operated IED
LOC – Line of Communication	WIA – Wounded in Action
LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas	
MSR – Main Supply Routes	
NFI – No Further Information	
NSTR – Nothing Significant To Report	
PBA – Post Blast Analysis	
PBIED – Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED	

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group	JMB – Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters	JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh
BIPP – Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani	KIA – Kachin Independence Army
BRN-C – Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate	KIM – Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao
BSF – Border Security Forces	KIO – Kachin Independence Organization
BNP – Bangladesh National Party	LeT – Lashkar-e Tayyiba
BriMob – Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)	MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
CPI-M – Communist Party of India (Maoist)	MILF-SOG – MILF-Special Operations Group
CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines	NPA – New People's Army
CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)	PNP – Philippine National Police
GMIP – Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani	POLRI – Indonesian National Police
HM – Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	PULO – Patani United Liberation Organization
HNLC – Hynniewtre National Liberation Council (India)	RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)
HUJI-B – Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh	RKK – Runda Kumpulan Kecil
IB – India's Intelligence Bureau	SJMM – Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha
IM – Indian Mujahideen	SJTMM – Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
IrW – Irregular Warfare	ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)	UWSA – United Wa State Army
ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham	YCL – Youth Communist League
JAT – Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid	
JI – Jemaah Islamiya	
JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha	
JIB – Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh	
JeM – Jaish-e-Mohammed	